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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has
regarded enterprise annuities (employer-sponsored pen-
sion plans) as an important pillar of the pension system
and tax policy as a key instrument for establishing enter-
prise annuities. Borrowing the metaphor from Prof.
Graetz,1 enterprise annuities and tax policy were engaged
to be married for the past 15 years. Yet the formal marriage
has not taken place. This article explores why that is the
case. The second part of the article discusses the role of
enterprise annuities in China’s pension system, and the
third part considers the regulatory framework. The final
two parts describe the current tax treatment of enterprise
annuities in China and analyse the reasons why tax incen-
tive legislation has not been enacted.
2. ENTERPRISE ANNUITIES AND CHINA’S
PENSION SYSTEM
2.1. “Enterprise annuity” defined
The term “enterprise annuities” is used in China to refer to
occupational pension schemes or employer-sponsored
pension plans. “Enterprise annuity” is defined in Art. 2 of
the Enterprise Annuity Rules (see below) as a “supple-
mental pension system voluntarily established by an enter-
prise and its staff on the basis of participation in the basic
pension plan”.
As early as 1991, the government began to call upon enter-
prises to establish supplementary pension plans for their
employees.2 The same policy was written into the Labour
Law (1994). In 1995, enterprise annuities were regarded
as the second pillar of China’s pension system. In 2000,
the State Council confirmed that enterprise annuities
should take the form of defined-contribution plans and be
managed in accordance with market principles.3 Some
local governments introduced their own rules to regulate
enterprise annuities. By 2004, most of the enterprise annu-
ity plans were established by firms in Shanghai, Shenzhen,
Dalian and other coastal cities that have enjoyed rapid eco-
nomic growth as well as national enterprises in the rail-
way, electricity, petroleum, chemical and financial sectors.
The annuity funds were managed by the local social secur-
ity administration or the sponsoring enterprise.
In 2004, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security
(MOLSS) introduced temporary measures to standardize
the regulation of enterprise annuities across the country.
These measures include the Enterprise Annuity Rules
(Trial),4 the Enterprise Annuity Fund Management Rules,5
and a set of companion rules on the regulation of service
providers.6
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2.2. Pillar 1 and enterprise annuities as Pillar 2
On the basis of the recommendations of the World Bank,
China adopted a three-pillar pension system in the mid-
1990s. Pillar 1 is a mandatory public pension system; Pil-
lar 2 is a voluntary, supplementary enterprise annuity sys-
tem; and Pillar 3 consists of individual retirement savings.
Pillar 3 hardly exists at present and is not supported by any
specific government policy or regulation.
Pillar 1 is a government-sponsored pension system. It has
two components: the pay-go-based or social pooling com-
ponent and individual pension accounts. The pay-go com-
ponent is funded by contributions by enterprises at a rate
up to 20% of their payroll (which includes the portion allo-
cated to workers’ individual accounts). Because the social
pooling is at the provincial level,7 the exact rate of contri-
butions is set by the provincial government. If a higher rate
is needed in a province, approval must be obtained from
the central government. An individual pension account is
funded by contributions from both the individual and
his/her employer. Typically, the worker contributes up to
8% of his/her pensionable earnings and the employer con-
tributes 3%, which amounts to a total of 11% of the
worker’s pensionable earnings. The funds in the individual
accounts earn interest every year and cannot be used for
purposes other than old-age pensions. These accounts are
portable when a worker changes his/her job.
Pillar 1 is designed to provide a basic pension of up to 40%
or 45% of the average salary at the time of retirement.
Individuals who start working after 1996 and contribute to
the basic pension system for a total of 15 years are eligible
for a monthly “basic pension” upon retirement. A basic
pension consists of a minimum pension and the individual
account pension. The former is paid out of the social pool-
ing and is set at 20% of the average monthly salary in the
particular province (or autonomous region or municipality
directly under the control of the central government) at the
time of payment. The pension paid out of the individual
account is the balance in the account divided by 120. Indi-
viduals who fail to make contributions for 15 years are not
eligible for the minimum pension, and the funds in the
individual accounts are paid in a lump sum at the time of
retirement.
There has been a general funding problem in the pay-go
component of Pillar 1 because current contributions are
inadequate to finance current benefit payments. The fund-
ing problem was worsened by the increasing dependency
ratio. For example, between 1993 and 1998, participants in
the basic pension grew by 15.5%, but the number of
retirees increased by 67.5%. Many cities experienced pay-
ment delays and protests by pensioners. Many enterprises
were undergoing financial difficulties and could not make
pension contributions. The financial crisis is expected to
worsen. The government has not found a sustainable
source of funding for the pension promises made to work-
ers covered by the pre-1995 system (the “middle people”)
or for the retirees drawing pensions from the pension
pools. Many pension pools run a deficit and need to be
bailed out by the central government. On average, about
5% of the budget revenue is used to fill the pension gaps.
Most of the individual accounts are “empty” as a result of
“borrowing” to finance the basic pension payments. These
empty accounts need to be capitalized when the current
workers retire.
Pillar 2 is intended to provide supplemental pension bene-
fits to workers without imposing a financial burden on the
government. It is hoped that enterprise annuities could
function like their counterparts in the OECD countries.8 In
the OECD countries, tax-assisted private pensions are
important schemes in helping individuals (typically in
middle or high-income groups) to save outside the public
pension system.9
2.3. Political, social and economic implications of
pensions
Pensions are fundamentally important in China. China’s
population is ageing at an accelerating rate owing to three
possible factors: (a) the baby boom in the 1950s and
1960s; (b) the “single child per family” policy, resulting in
a four-two-one family structure featuring four grandpar-
ents, two parents and one child; and (c) the increasing
longevity of the Chinese people. The percentage of indi-
viduals aged 60 and older in China’s population was 10%
in 1999 and is expected to be 20.42% in 2030. By 2030,
retirees will account for more than 40% of workers.10
China’s population is also aging faster than others. For
example, the percentage of retirees (65 years and older)
grew from 7% to 14% of the population in 115 years in
France and 66 years in the United States, but only 25 years
in China.11 All this means that there will be fewer young
people in the future to pay taxes which can adequately
support the elderly.
For the moment, pensions are also a political issue. The
transition from the command economy to a market-based
economy has been accompanied by impressive economic
growth and the creation of millions of millionaires in
China. At the same time, however, there are many
“losers”. The income disparity problem in China is worse
than that not only in the OECD countries, but also in coun-
tries in South-East Asia and the previous Soviet block.12
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This problem is worsening. Retirees fetch poorly from the
fruits of economic reform, and thousands of them choose
to demonstrate in front of government offices. The
increasing income disparity among different income
groups is considered a major source of social disharmony
and political unrest. The government recently made
“building social harmony” one of its major tasks in the
future. Establishing a sustainable pension system is a key
element of this initiative.
In addition to the political and social implications, the pen-
sion system has a significant economic impact on the
reform of state-owned enterprises, the formation of
China’s capital market, and the transition towards a mar-
ket-based economy. This can be seen from the history of
the pension system:
(a) Pre-1949. China was a predominantly agricultural,
rural-based society. As such, the family was the main
source of income support. As in other countries, the pro-
cess of industrialization has been accompanied by the cre-
ation and development of social security programmes,
including pensions. Although retirement income was pro-
vided to government officials as early as 2000 years ago,13
there were no social organizations that provided adequate
income security to old people.
(b) Strict socialism (1949 to the early 1980s). A “social-
ist” pension system, that is, the “iron rice bowl” system,
was practised to provide old-age income security for civil
servants and workers in state-owned enterprises. Under
this system, retirees received pensions directly from their
previous work units (employers). This system was consist-
ent with the centrally planned economic model under
which enterprises were merely instruments to implement
the state plans and were not profit-seeking enterprises. It
worked reasonably well before the economic reforms in
the late 1970s because there was virtually no labour mobil-
ity and the government implicitly assumed responsibility
for all enterprises. Technically, it was a pay-go system, and
no special pension fund was set up to finance the payment
of pensions.
(c) Transition to a socialist market economy. The eco-
nomic reforms that began in the late 1970s gave enter-
prises more financial autonomy and made them increas-
ingly responsible for their own profits and losses. In order
to “free” state-owned enterprises from the burden of pro-
viding pensions and other social security benefits to their
workers, the government gradually shifted the burden to
local governments, while requiring enterprises to make
contributions. The public pension system was created in
the mid-1990s to provide minimum retirement income
security to workers.14
(d) Developing market fundamentals. Private pensions in
Pillar 2 are intended to further facilitate the economic
transition by creating a “win, win, win, win” system to the
government, enterprises, workers and financial institu-
tions. To the government, Pillar 2 can be a key element of
the overall retirement income system by providing supple-
mentary pension income to retirees. To enterprises, it can
help them compete in attracting and retaining highly quali-
fied employees. To workers, it is a useful vehicle for them
to obtain better benefits and more retirement income se-
curity. Finally, to financial institutions, enterprise annuity
funds could become a massive pool of capital for the cap-
ital market. It is estimated that pension funds in China
could exceed USD 160 billion by 2030 and become the
world’s third largest pension market.15
3. REGULATION OF ENTERPRISE ANNUITIES
3.1. Four basic principles
Four basic principles guide the development of China’s
enterprise annuity system:16 (1) enterprise annuities are
voluntary; (2) an enterprise annuity plan must be a
defined-contribution plan; (3) tax assistance will be pro-
vided to enterprises (see 4.2.); and (4) enterprise annuities
must be managed in accordance with market principles.
3.2. Voluntary
An enterprise is not legally required to set up an annuity
plan. If an enterprise chooses to sponsor an annuity plan,
however, it must meet three key conditions: (a) it must ful-
fil its obligations to pay into the basic pension system; (b)
it must have the capability to bear the economic burden;
and (c) it must establish a collective consultation mech-
anism.
The sponsoring enterprise must consult with the trade
union or the employees’ representatives about creating an
annuity fund. The sponsoring enterprise must also prepare
an annuity plan. If the enterprise is owned or controlled by
the state, the plan must be approved by the workers’
congress. The plan must set out the following: scope of
coverage; method of funding; method of managing the
individual accounts within the annuity system; method of
managing the annuity fund; method of computing and
paying annuities; conditions for determining entitlement
to annuity payments; system of administration and super-
vision; conditions for terminating contributions; and other
matters. The plan should cover all workers who have com-
pleted the trial period, and it must be submitted to the local
social security administration for approval. For enterprises
directly controlled by the central government, approval
must be obtained from the MOLSS.
An enterprise annuity fund is a supplemental occupational
pension fund that is financed by contributions and accu-
mulated investment earnings. In other words, an annuity
fund has three sources of funding: enterprises’ contribu-
tions, employees’ contributions, and gains and earnings
derived from investing the contributed capital. The assets
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of the fund are segregated from those of the sponsoring
enterprise. The fund is managed by a trustee.
3.3. Defined-contribution plans
Enterprise annuity funds must be defined-contribution
plans. Contributions must be made by both the sponsoring
enterprise and its employees. The enterprise’s contribu-
tions are, in principle, tax deductible up to a specified
amount (currently 4% of its total salary). The enterprise’s
annual contribution cannot exceed 1/12 of the previous
year’s total salary, and the total contribution by the enter-
prise and the employees cannot exceed 1/6 of the previous
year’s total salary. There are no specific formulae for
determining the amount of contributions by employees,
and their contributions are not tax deductible.
Some local governments have introduced detailed rules
for enterprises within their jurisdiction. For example, the
Shenzhen rules permit enterprises to contribute different
amounts in respect of employees at different stages of their
employment.17 For senior and close-to-retirement-age
employees, contributions can be made an at accelerated
rate. The Shenzhen rules also allow profit-sharing-type
plans under which an enterprise can contribute additional
amounts to the annuity plan if the enterprise’s profit
exceeds a specified level.
Each covered employee has an account in the annuity fund
which records his/her interest in the fund (including
his/her contributions, the enterprise’s contributions allo-
cated to him/her, and the investment earnings). The Enter-
prise Annuity Rules do not specify the formulae for allo-
cating the fund to each employee’s account. The Shenzhen
rules permit the use of any allocation method on the basis
of salary level, seniority and position. According to the
Shenzhen rules, an employee’s interest in his/her pension
account cannot be deprived by the sponsoring enterprise
as long as: (a) the interest is attributable to his/her own
contributions, (b) the interest is vested after the employee
has worked continuously for the enterprise for more than
ten years; or (c) the interest is attributed to an employment
contract that has been completed.
Moreover, if the employment of a covered employee is ter-
minated for cause by the enterprise, the enterprise may not
deprive the employee of his/her interest in the individual
account. On the other hand, the enterprise has the power to
confiscate all or part of the employee’s account if the
employee has significantly violated the rights of the enter-
prise, has violated the rules of conduct and caused serious
damage to the enterprise, or has engaged in competition
with the enterprise after the employment relationship
ended.
Upon retirement, an employee participating in an enter-
prise annuity fund may withdraw the funds from the indi-
vidual account in a lump sum or periodically. Under the
present tax law, these benefits are taxed as income. The
funds cannot be withdrawn by the employee prior to retire-
ment. If an employee changes his/her employment, how-
ever, the individual account is portable to the new
employer. If the new employer does not have an annuity
plan, the individual account can be managed by the previ-
ous trustee.
3.4. Professional management
Each enterprise annuity fund is a trust. As such, the fund is
legally separate from the enterprise and is managed by a
trustee, with the sponsoring enterprise as the settlor and
the participating employees as the beneficiaries.
According to the Enterprise Annuity Fund Management
Rules, the assets of the fund are segregated from those of
the sponsoring enterprise (or settlor), the trustee, the cus-
todian, or the investment managers appointed by the
trustee. The trust fund can be used only to pay debts asso-
ciated with the trust.
The trustee can be the board of trustees established by the
sponsoring enterprise or a corporate trustee appointed by
the sponsoring enterprise. The board of trustees is com-
prised of members from both inside and outside the enter-
prise. No less than one third of the members, however,
must be representatives of the employees. The only man-
date of the board of trustees is to manage the annuity fund,
and the board is prohibited from engaging in any other
business activities. Appointing a corporate trustee must be
done through a written contract. A corporate trustee must:
– be registered in China;
– have a minimum registered capital of CNY 100 mil-
lion and minimum net assets at any relevant time of
CNY 150 million;
– have a perfect management structure;
– have on its staff the required number of professional
personnel who are qualified to manage enterprise
annuity funds;
– have a business site, sound security measures, and
other infrastructure necessary for managing the trust
fund;
– have a perfect internal audit and assessment system
and a risk-control system;
– not have committed any major illegal acts within the
past three years; and
– have met the other conditions specified in other state
regulations.
The trustee’s powers and obligations are governed by
China’s Trust Law.18 The fundamental principles of the
Trust Law are the same as those found in common law
jurisdictions. In performing its duties, a trustee must abide
by the principles of honesty and prudence. A trustee must
follow the provisions of the trust deed and manage the
trust in the best interest of the beneficiaries.19 In addition,
a trustee must be “honest, creditable, prudent and diligent”
in performing its duties.20
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The trustee of an annuity fund may enter into a contract
with a third party as an account manager, investment man-
ager or custodian of the trust fund. The Enterprise Annuity
Fund Management Rules set forth the conditions that a
financial institution or securities investment fund com-
pany must satisfy to qualify as a manager or custodian of
an annuity fund. These rules also prescribe the maximum
fees payable to the trustee and third parties. For example,
the fee payable to the trustee may not exceed 0.2% of the
net assets of the trust fund, and the fee payable to an
investment manager may not exceed 1.2% of the net assets
under his/her management.21 The trustee, account man-
ager, investment manager and custodian all have the duty
to provide true and complete information to the competent
government agencies (such as the MOLSS) within the
specified time periods.
The general investment policy goals are prudence, diversi-
fication, security and liquidity, and professionalism.22 The
managers and staff of an investment manager may not
hold any position in the fund’s sponsoring enterprise or as
an investment manager for another fund. Moreover, the
investment manager may not be the settlor or have any
interlocking investment.
Investment choices include both debt and equity instru-
ments as well as insurance products and mutual funds. The
present investment mix is as follows:
– minimum 20% in savings accounts, bank commercial
paper, short-term bonds and other money-market
mutual funds;
– maximum 50% of net assets in term deposits, nego-
tiable instruments, treasury bills (minimum 20% of net
assets), financial debt instruments, corporate debt and
other convertible debt obligations, and bond funds;
and
– maximum 30% of net assets in equities, insurance
products with savings features, and equity mutual
funds (not more than 20% of net assets may be
invested in equities).23
The MOLSS will revise the investment mix in the future in
accordance with market developments.
An annuity fund’s investment in a single corporation (or
investment fund) is limited to the lesser of 10% of the net
assets of the annuity fund managed by a particular invest-
ment manager and 5% of the securities of the invested cor-
poration (or units of investment fund). Prior approval must
be obtained from the trustee if an investment manager
wants to invest the annuity fund in its own investment
products.
3.5. International aspects
There are some notable international aspects in the Enter-
prise Annuity Rules and Enterprise Annuity Fund Man-
agement Rules. First, enterprises that are eligible to estab-
lish an annuity fund are not limited to those owned by the
Chinese. Chinese-foreign joint ventures, wholly foreign-
owned enterprises, and Chinese companies invested in by
foreign investors are eligible as well. Indeed, these com-
panies are better positioned to create annuity funds as their
workers tend to be younger and their financial position is
stronger than that of state-owned enterprises. Second,
there are no rules limiting covered employees to Chinese
citizens. Therefore, foreign citizens working in China can
be covered. If a covered employee leaves China before
retirement, the balance in the individual account can be
withdrawn. Third, investment managers, account man-
agers and other service providers are not limited to Chi-
nese-owned companies. Chinese-foreign joint venture
investment fund companies that meet specified conditions
may be appointed as investment managers. Finally, inter-
national investment by an annuity fund is neither specif-
ically allowed nor specifically prohibited.
4. TAX POLICY
4.1. Crucial role of the tax system
Tax subsidies play a crucial role in the development and
expansion of employer-sponsored pension plans in the
OECD countries. These subsidies typically take the form
of a tax deduction for pension contributions and/or a tax
exemption for the investment earnings of a pension trust.
The tax on the contributions and investment earnings is
deferred until the pension benefits are received by the pen-
sion plan member. The value of the deferral depends on
the marginal tax rate applicable to the enterprises and
employees. The higher the tax rate, the more tax savings
result from the tax subsidies. In progressive income tax
systems, the taxpayers who benefit most from tax-assisted
private pension plans are naturally those in the middle and
high-income groups. Indeed, it is arguable that these
groups of individuals are by design the targeted benefi-
ciaries of the tax assistance.
4.2. Current tax treatment of enterprise annuities
Under the general principles of the income tax law applic-
able to enterprises,24 the wages and salaries paid by an
enterprise are clearly deductible to it in computing its
profit. In the absence of specific authorization, the pay-
ments made by an enterprise to a pension fund for the 
benefit of its current workers are generally not deductible.
The enterprise income tax legislation has no specific pro-
vision on the deduction of pension contributions.
The Enterprise Annuity Rules provide for an employer’s
contribution to an annuity plan of up to 1/12 of the previous
year’s total payroll, but are silent on the tax deductibility
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of the contribution. The Ministry of Finance has not
adopted companion tax measures to clarify this issue.
Despite the legislative void, enterprises that have spon-
sored annuity plans have been able to deduct their contri-
butions, albeit at different levels determined by local gov-
ernments. The “green light” for such a deduction was
given in a State Council document entitled “Plan for the
Trial Implementation of Perfecting the Social Security
System in Cities and Townships” (Guo Fa [2000] No. 42):
enterprises could deduct up to 4% of the total salary. Some
local governments have introduced their own tax measures
to allow a deduction, ranging from 4% to 8% (or more) of
the total salary.25 For example, in Jiangsu Province, a
sponsoring employer may deduct contributions up to 1.5%
per month of the salaries paid to its employees.26
As regards employees, the value of an employer’s contri-
bution to an annuity plan is not taxable to the employee as
a fringe benefit. On the other hand, the employee’s contri-
butions to an enterprise annuity are not tax deductible
under the Individual Income Tax Law,27 and they may be
made only out of after-tax income. In contrast to the
deduction for employers, there has been no State Council
policy or local government position on the deductibility to
individuals. It seems clear, though, that the benefits
received from an annuity plan are taxable.
In the absence of legislative provisions or government pol-
icy, the investment earnings of an annuity trust are not cur-
rently taxable to the trust or to its beneficiaries (i.e.
employees).
5. REASONS FOR POSTPONING THE
MARRIAGE OF TAX POLICY AND
ENTERPRISE ANNUITIES
Tax subsidies to private pensions are tax expenditures.
They can be justified on several policy grounds, such as
overcoming myopia by inducing individuals to save, pro-
moting firm productivity, providing capital supply for
investment, and correcting market failure.28 These policy
justifications appear to be equally valid in China. In fact,
the need for a tax subsidy seems obvious as well. Accord-
ing to one survey, 85% of the state-owned medium-sized
and large enterprises prefer to wait for a more generous tax
subsidy before establishing an annuity fund.29 Why has the
promulgation of tax incentives to assist enterprise annu-
ities been postponed? Several reasons might be offered as
explanations.
5.1. Tax subsidy to “profitable” enterprises
For obvious reasons, an enterprise will be interested in a
tax subsidy for creating an annuity plan if the enterprise is
in a financial position to establish an annuity plan and can
actually benefit from the tax subsidy. Enterprises that are
already in financial difficulties cannot benefit from the tax
subsidy. At present, the vast majority of annuity plans has
been established by enterprises controlled by the central
government or enterprises that enjoy a high-level mon-
opoly (such as in the railway, banking, energy, telecom-
munications and electricity sectors).30 These enterprises
are already the envy of other enterprises. Providing prof-
itable enterprises with more assistance by way of tax sub-
sidies is difficult to justify in the current situation. On the
other hand, the tax incentives for enterprise annuities
granted by local governments generally do not benefit
enterprises controlled by the central government. The lack
of national tax incentives is a real hurdle to these enter-
prises in expanding their annuity plans.31
A related tax policy issue is the sharing of tax revenue and
tax expenditure between the central government and local
governments. Under China’s current constitutional and tax
laws, the sharing is not done in accordance with any le-
gislative rules; rather, it is negotiated on a case-by-case
basis. Unless the central government can make up the rev-
enue loss from the tax subsidy for enterprise annuities,
local governments (with the exception of Shenzhen,
Shanghai and a few other local governments that are finan-
cially healthy) will not be very interested in giving up
more tax revenue to subsidize profitable enterprises.
5.2. Limited coverage and tax inequity
By the end of March 2004, less than 3% of urban workers
(about seven million individuals) were covered by enter-
prise annuity plans. In comparison, in 2003, the public
pension system covered over 60% of urban workers (about
155 million individuals).32 Rural workers were generally
excluded from both public and private pensions: less than
1% of working-age peasants are covered by public pen-
sions.33
Using tax expenditure to benefit a small percentage of
workers (the elite class in China’s working population)
raises serious equity concerns. It is easily perceived as a
reverse tax subsidy, worsening the income disparity prob-
lem in China. Because of regional economic disparities
and the lack of a national pension law or standard,34 the tax
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subsidy for enterprise annuities also raises equity issues
among workers in economically developed coastal regions
and less developed inland regions. Such a disparity is
already obvious in the public pension system. In affluent
regions, the benefit level is much higher. For example, in
2004, the average per capita monthly pension was CNY
1,800 in Shenzhen and CNY 885 in Beijing, but only CNY
496 in Jiangxi, while the national average was CNY 620.35
Enterprise annuities are expected to further amplify the
income disparity.
5.3. Myopia unlikely corrected by tax subsidies
The assumption that tax subsidies help individuals save
for their retirement makes sense as a practical matter if the
tax subsidy can result in changes in the behaviour of
employers and employees. Even with generous tax incen-
tives, many enterprises are unlikely to change their policy
on pensions for two possible reasons. First, enterprises
that are not in compliance with contributions to public
pensions are unlikely to set up an annuity fund. Many
enterprises are not financially capable of making contribu-
tions. Others deliberately avoid contributory obligations
by reporting only the “nominal” wage (i.e. excluding the
cost of benefits, bonuses and other remuneration) or delay
their payment of pension contributions. The non-compli-
ance problem is so serious that the government has taken
some drastic measures to address it. For example, the
MOLSS once summoned the managers of over 200 large
non-compliant enterprises to attend a “training session”
and made the managers sign an agreement with the gov-
ernment to make the pension contributions that were long
overdue.36
Second, enterprises probably face little pressure from
organized workers. Workers are often not unionized. Even
where unions are formed, trade unions in China do not
function as bargaining units. The huge pool of migrant
workers from less developed regions and rural areas keeps
the industrial wage low and makes it difficult for workers
to bargain for better remuneration packages, including
enterprise annuity benefits. The market for enterprise
managers is being developed in China, and the turnover
rate of management personnel is high. Thus, using annuity
benefits as a tool for retaining managers may not be con-
sidered very effective. Neither workers nor managers
seem to be pushing their employers to set up annuity plans.
Individual workers, while they welcome any additional
benefits to be gained from the enterprise annuity system,
may not be highly enthusiastic in fighting for them. More-
over, individual workers will be unlikely to modify their
savings pattern because of a tax subsidy for enterprise
annuities. They generally prefer to save for their child’s
education and for purchasing a home. There seems to be a
lack of confidence in the pension system, which may be
due to reasons such as the short history of the pension sys-
tem, the poor performance of the stock market, and the
financial crisis in the basic pension system.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The importance of enterprise annuities is gaining recogni-
tion in China, especially by the central government, prof-
itable enterprises and the capital market. The crucial role
of tax policy in promoting the development of enterprise
annuities has been proved in developed countries and is
being acknowledged in China. While limited tax incen-
tives have been granted by some local governments, it
may take some time for the central government to formu-
late the national tax policy in this area. The marriage of
enterprise annuities and tax policy will eventually take
place, and it will undoubtedly determine the speed of
growth of Chinese pension funds, which in turn will have
a significant impact on the size of China’s capital market.
a vested pension, retirement age, marriage breakdown, etc.), contributions,
investment rules, termination, merger, conversion of plans and pension plan
governance. The current MOLSS rules provide some basic guidelines on plan
governance and investment, but not on other issues.
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